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THE PROHIBITION HANGOVER:
WHY WE ARE STILL FEELING THE EFFECTS OF PROHIBITION
Marcia Yablon *
INTRODUCTION
There is a widespread belief that the Twenty-First Amendment did
nothing more than repeal Prohibition.' Many people also believe that the
temperance movement and its influence similarly ended with the
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment.2 However, as widespread
as this belief is, it ignores the continuing importance of section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment. Section 2 states that "[t]he transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited. '' 3 Despite the relative obscurity of this
clause, in the seventy years since the repeal of Prohibition, section 2 has
had, and continues to have, a significant impact on the way in which
alcohol is produced, sold, and consumed in America. And as such, the
influence of the temperance movement and Prohibition continues to be
felt.
The far reaching impact of the Twenty-First Amendment can be seen
in the influence it has had on issues well beyond simply "the
transportation or importation" of alcohol. The Amendment has had an
impact on numerous other areas of law such as free speech, interstate
commerce, antitrust, and equal protection. Nevertheless, when the
Twenty-First Amendment has been employed in these other areas of law,
scholars have been quick to criticize such usage. Many critics argue that
. Marcia Yablon is an associate in the New York office of Steptoe & Johnson LLP and
a graduate of the Yale Law School. She would like to thank her legal history professor
Robert Gordon for his assistance with this article.
Over and over again journalists and readers refer to Prohibition as a failed
experiment and the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment as signaling its
end. See e.g., Anthony Infanti, Letters to the Editor, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, MARCH 15, 2004, at A-10 (stating that "Prohibition was a "failed
experiment" that "necessitated two successful Amendments to the
Constitution-the 18th to write it in, and the 21st to write it out."). See also
infra note 4.
2 Infanti, supra note 2, at A-10.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §2.
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the courts' use of the Twenty-First Amendment in these areas is
inconsistent and unsupportable, but such criticisms are myopic and
misinformed. An examination of the history of the temperance
movement and the push for Prohibition reveals that the use of the
Twenty-First Amendment in these other areas was both intended and
desired. By employing the Twenty-First Amendment in these other
areas of law, courts are actually honoring the history and intention of
Prohibition and therefore, such applications of the Twenty-First
Amendment deserve praise rather than criticism.
Over time, the purpose behind the ratification and then repeal of
National Prohibition has been forgotten by the majority of Americans.
Currently, Prohibition is most often referred to as a "failed experiment"
or a "strange aberration" in our country's history.4 However, although
Prohibition was the culmination of the temperance movement's goals,
the temperance movement itself was nothing new. This movement had
been an important and accepted part of American society since the early
Nineteenth Century.5 Consequently, in 1933, when the Twenty-First
Amendment was passed, it was not at all clear that the Amendment's
ratification signified the end of the temperance movement. The
temperance movement had faced other, nearly as great, setbacks before,6
and the Twenty-First Amendment was seen only as the end of National
Prohibition, not necessarily, or even likely, the end of the temperance
movement. As Historian Norman Clark explained, "[r]epeal was by no
means the very end; it was not a social fluke or a moral retrogression.,
7
Instead, after repeal, there was an enduring struggle for many people "to
4 See e.g., Jay Maeder, Blows Against the Empire Repeal, DAILY NEWS, May
29, 2000, at 23 (stating that "the great failed social experiment called
Prohibition would pass into history"); Mark Sauer, Anti-war Movement;
Protesters say it's Time for the Government to Halt Drug Battles, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 2000, at DI (describing the "the repeal of Prohibition"
as evidence that Prohibition had been "an utter failure."); James Conaway,
California's Anti-Spirit Spirit, THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Oct. 11,
1987 at W43 ("Prohibition was a social disgrace and a national disaster lasting
for 13 years.").
5 See Norman H. Clark, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
PROHIBITION, 31-33 (1976).
6 In 1855, thirteen states had "Maine Laws" which prohibited the manufacture
and sale of spirits or intoxicating liquors. However with the coming of the Civil
War the temperance movement lost much of its force and by the time of the war
eight of the thirteen states had gotten rid of these laws. Id. at 47-48.
7 Id. at 169.
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define how much or how little liquor control was consistent with the
circumstances of life in the second half of the twentieth century." 8
Although National Prohibition ended with the ratification of the
Twenty-First Amendment, state and local Prohibition was expected to,
and did, continue long after its passage. Similarly, liquor regulation did
not conclude with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Instead,
after repeal the country returned to a system of liquor regulation very
similar to the system in place immediately before Prohibition.
"Although the new system of state alcohol regulation was more uniform
in practice and more efficient in enforcement, it nevertheless resembled
the basic forms of liquor control practiced at the turn of the century ....9
Therefore, if the true purpose of repeal was not a rejection of the goals of
the temperance movement, but simply an acknowledgement of the
failure of Nationwide Prohibition, then in order to evaluate the propriety
of the current usage of the Twenty-First Amendment, one needs to
examine the concerns about alcohol that were prevalent in the decades
leading up to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.
This paper will argue that many of the goals of the temperance
movement were not repudiated by the repeal of National Prohibition,
that section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment was created to effectuate
these temperance goals, and that these goals do and should continue to
inform judicial decisions regarding alcohol. This paper will examine
three types of cases for which the use of the Twenty-First Amendment is
frequently criticized: family activities, nude dancing, and direct
shipment, and will attempt to explain how court decisions in these areas
reflect the legacy of the temperance movement and continue to address
the concerns that precipitated the move for Prohibition in the first place.
I. ALCOHOL AND THE THREAT TO THE FAMILY
A. ALCOHOL AS A CURRENT THREAT TO FAMILY VALUES
The case of Spudich v. Smarr1° demonstrates how a re-examination
of the history of the temperance movement can help explain modem
judicial decisions involving the Twenty-First Amendment. Spudich is a
confusing case when analyzed solely under the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, but it makes sense when viewed in light of the history and
purpose of alcohol regulation before Prohibition. In Spudich, a billiards
8id.
9 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 186.
10 931 F.2d 1278, 1281 (8th Cir. 1991).
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hall owner challenged a state law that made it possible for his
competitors, amusement facilities offering bowling or soccer, to obtain a
liquor license, but barred his establishment from obtaining one. Mr.
Spudich argued that this law was an equal protection violation because
his establishment was as much an amusement facility as that of his
competitors yet the law distinguished between the two in the granting of
liquor licenses. The Spudich court, however, found no equal protection
violation. Instead, the court held that the state had broad authority under
the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate alcohol, and it concluded that
the state could reasonably have distinguished "family oriented sports
facilities" from other "activities which represent a greater threat of
disruptive behavior.""
At first glance, such an explanation seems rather strained and as a
result, many scholars have questioned this type of distinction. Such
scholars have been unwilling to accept the "reasonableness" of alcohol
regulation based on an establishment's suitability for children and
families. As a result, these commentators have frequently looked for
other motives, such as protectionism, to explain these types of decisions.
One critic referred to the outcome in Spudich as "lifestyle bias," and
lamented the fact that the equal protection doctrine provides little
" Id. Historically, billiards halls have posed a greater threat of disruptive
behavior than other types of amusement facilities and were frequently equated
with the depravities of the saloon (discussed more fully in Section II below).
For an example of this comparison between the pool hall and the saloon, see In
re Lundy, 143 P. 885 (1914), in which the court interprets a Washington state
statute defining delinquency as the visitation by minors of "billiard room[s] or
pool room[s], or any saloon." Id. at 153. According to the Washington State
statute interpreted in Lundy, both billiards halls and saloons are equally unfit
places for children. Similarly, Indiana delinquency laws of the period also
specifically included the patronizing of "saloons" or "pool halls" in the state's
definition of juvenile delinquency. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the
Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 BYU L. REV. 362 (1991). See also
Ill. Laws 1905 §1 at 153. One law review article from the forties disgustedly
describes the pool room as the worst sort of place that attracted loafers and
loiterers, and a law review article from the thirties states that the pool hall, like
the saloon, has "traditionally been considered as subject to stringent regulations
by the state, being classified .. .as a 'dangerous,' questionable, or merely
tolerated business." William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26
MINN. L. REV. 596 (1941-42); James W. Mehaffy, Recent Decisions, 36 MICH.
L. REV. 1404 (1937-38). As these cases, statutes and articles demonstrate, pool
halls, at least traditionally, were not the sort of place where you would want to
take the kids.
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authority to prevent what he believed was an unprincipled intention to
"benefit particular businesses over others.' ', 2 Many other commentators
have also insinuated that the "family values rhetoric" of alcohol
regulation is simply a cover allowing protectionism. 13
However, Spudich is not an isolated case. There are many other
instances of the courts drawing this type of distinction between family
oriented drinking establishments and other types of places selling
alcohol. Another example of such a distinction is the Pennsylvania
appellate court's decision in Boston Concessions Group v. Logan Twp.
Bd. of Supervisors.14 Like Spudich, this case demonstrates the different
levels of concern courts have regarding alcohol consumption in family
versus non-family establishments. In Boston Concessions Group, the
appellate court upheld the trial court's reversal of the Township's Board
of Supervisors' decision to deny a liquor license to the Boston
Concessions Group. The Boston Concessions Group requested the
license so that they could sell liquor at Lakemont Park, a family
amusement park. The Boston Concessions Group court held not only
that it is "a general rule [that] a licensed establishment is not ordinarily
detrimental to the welfare, health and morals of the inhabitants of a
neighborhood,"' 5 but also that the granting of the license would actually
be beneficial to the patrons of the park.
16
In reaching this decision, the court distinguished Boston Concessions
Group from Commonwealth v. Koehler's Bar, Inc.,17 even though the
facts of the two cases were extremely similar. The only real difference
between the two cases was that Koehler did not involve a family
establishment. In Koehler, the court held that the "welfare, health, peace
and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood" would be harmed by
the granting a local restaurant/bar a liquor license. 18 The Koehler court
found that community "opinions that this establishment would be
12 John M. Faust, Note, Of Saloons and Social Control. Assessing the Impact of
State Liquor Control on Individual Expression, 80 VA. L. REV. 745, 765 (1994).
13 Clayton L. Silvernail, Comment: Smoke, Mirrors and Myopia: How the States
Are Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine in
Interstate Commerce, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 499 n.3 (2003).
14 815 A.2d 8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
'" Id. at 14.
16 The park currently permitted patrons to bring their own alcohol to the park
and the court believed that a licensed distributor would increase the supervision
of alcohol consumption in the park.
17 201 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964).
18 Id. at 307.
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detrimental" were a sufficient basis upon which to deny the license.
19
However, in Boston Concessions Group, the court found that almost
identical community concerns were an insufficient basis upon which to
deny a liquor license.
The Boston Concessions Group court distinguished Koehler based
on the fact that the amusement park already allowed patrons to bring in
their own alcohol for private functions held in the pavilion area of the
park. However, this explanation for the different outcomes in the two
cases is not entirely satisfactory. It does not explain why in Koehler the
court held "that mere protests or the fact that there are a large number of
protestants" can be enough to deny a license2 ° while in Boston
Concessions Group, the court found such protests entirely
unpersuasive. 21 In Boston Concessions Group, the protestors believed it
was the sale of alcohol by the park in the main areas of the park that was
concerning, not the alcohol brought to private functions held in secluded
areas; nevertheless, the court found it easy to dismiss these concerns.
The difference in the two courts' receptivity to liquor license
protests can perhaps be better explained by the difference in the types of
establishments requesting the license. In Koehler, the appellant applicant
was requesting a license for a bar22 whereas the license in Boston
Concessions Group was for a family amusement park. The court's
determination of the "reasonableness" of the community's concerns
regarding alcohol sales may be due once again to the difference in the
perceived threat between family versus non-family alcohol
establishments. The Boston Concessions Group court not only believed
that selling alcohol in a family amusement park was not detrimental to
public health, but it also believed that it was greatly preferable to the
existing regulations which allowed patrons to bring their own alcohol for
private functions. The court viewed drinking amongst families and in
front of children as harmless, while it viewed drinking at private
functions and away from these families as much more concerning.
A third example of the courts' tendency to favor family
establishments over others in liquor license cases is the Minnesota case
'9 Id at 307-08.20 Id. at 307.
21 Boston Concessions Group, 815 A.2d at 10.
22 Although the bar also served food there was an indication in the opinion that
the food service was incidental to the serving of alcohol. In any event, there was
no indication that the bar/restaurant was in any respects a family establishment.
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Bergmann v. City of Melrose. In Bergmann, like in Spudich, the
plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of an equal protection
violation. They argued that the state's conditioning the issuance of a
liquor license on the establishment of a family restaurant violated the
Constitution's Equal Protection clause. However, the Bergman court
disagreed. The court held that a "city may subject businesses conducted
on premises where liquor is sold to reasonable regulations and
conditions" and that "[i]t may also require license holders to make
certain concessions in exchange for their licenses. 24 The court found
the city's decision to grant a liquor license to a family restaurant, but to
deny it to a liquor-only establishment, was a reasonable distinction that
did not violate equal protection.25 Furthermore, the Bergman court
agreed with the city that although another liquor-only establishment was
undesirable, a family restaurant, including one that sold alcohol, would
actually improve the public welfare. 26
B. THE NINETEENTH CENTURYAND ALCOHOL'S TRHEAT TO THE FAMILY
Although the distinction drawn by the Spudich court, and others,
between alcohol establishments that threaten the family and those that
actually benefit the family seems somewhat counterintuitive today, 7 it
23 420 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).24 Id. at 665.
25 Id. at 667.
26 id.
27 Today, critics frequently expound on the dangers of allowing alcohol
consumption to occur in the presence of families. For example, in an article
describing the denial of a liquor permit for a Florida bar that wanted to open up
near a family flea market, the author cited the local officials' concern regarding
the sale of alcohol in the presence of so many families. The officials were
worried about "the dangers of wholesome families passing through the flea
market entrance only to be confronted by the sight of rowdy drunks at a bar."
As a result, "the zoning board unanimously recommended against allowing the
tiki bar." What is even more striking is that the article describes the officials'
concern as silly, not because there was no danger in exposing families to
alcohol but because the author believed that "nobody running a big flea market
catering to the family trade is going to tolerate that kind of an operation on its
grounds. If it did, it would quickly lose that trade." Staff, Bonita zoning
officials rightly overturned, THE NEWS-PRESS (FORT MYERS, FL), AUG. 27, 2003
at 10B. The growing belief that children should not be exposed to adult
drinking can also been seen in legislation, such as that proposed a few years ago
in Chicago, to bar all children under the age of 21 from bars. The law reflects
the idea that "'If the parents are drinking, the kids shouldn't be with them."'
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was a distinction that would not have been foreign to Americans living
in the pre-Prohibition era. In addition, not only does this distinction
mirror pre-Prohibition concerns, these concerns are still quite relevant
today. During this period, alcohol was seen as a serious threat to the
family precisely because it was so often consumed away from the
family. Saloons were places that men went by themselves, separate from
their wives and children. In the Nineteenth Century, women were
exceedingly unwelcome in saloons.28 At this time, a woman's place was
in the home, but many men felt most at home in the neighborhood
saloon. "The saloon thereby served to effectively divorce husbands from
wives" and "pose[d] a serious threat to. . . family values." 29
This separation caused great anxiety in a society which placed
extreme importance on the home and the family. 30 There was a
widespread belief that "alcohol could disintegrate social and family
loyalties and that this disintegration would be followed by poverty and
crime and a frightful depth of conjugal squalor.",31 These fears were
especially felt by women, who were expected to protect the home and
family, and as a result, women became the driving force behind the push
towards Prohibition.32 "Women were culturally positioned to feel such
threats most keenly. The ideals of domesticity already encouraged
women to act as moral guardians for their families and to tutor their
children in the duties of virtuous citizenship., 33 Nineteenth Century
women "had identified drunkenness as an affront to middle-class
survival, a threat to the health and harmony of families, and a peril
awaiting every boy as he grew to manhood.,
34
Brian Jackson, Last Call for Family Pubs?, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 22,
1997, at 6.
28 Kevin Wendell Swain, Note, Liquor By the Book In Kansas: The Ghost of
Temperance Past, 35 WASHBuRN L.J. 322 (1996).
29 Id. See also Jon M. Kingsdale, The "Poor Man's Club": Social Functions of
the Urban Working-Class Saloon, 25 AMERICAN QUARTERLY, 472, 486 (1973)
("For married men.., the saloon was an escape from wife and family.").
30 The very fact that many American men spent time away from home drinking
caused unease in an age that lavished sentimental affection on the ideals of
home and family. See CLARK, supra note 6, at 42-43.
3 Id. at42.
32 Prohibition began the women's movement and it wasn't because women
believed in their right to vote but that as the "defenders of the home and its
purity [they] had the right and obligation to enter the streets." Id. at 73.
33 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 55.
34 Id.
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The perceived threat to the family posed by the saloon was further
enhanced by the tremendous wave of immigrants from drinking cultures,
particularly Irish immigrants, who came to America during this period.
Irish families were structured differently than most middle class
American families who found this difference extremely disconcerting.
These Irish families lived "lives that did not conform to the middle-class
model of the family., 35 For example, unlike American women, Irish
women "had a long tradition of working outside the home," and
therefore they did not fit the "ideology of women's separate spheres and
delicate natures. 36 In addition, Irish children frequently worked, and
they often earned nearly half their family's income. 37  The common
employment of women and children in Irish families contradicted the
Nineteenth Century "ideology of domesticity." This "vision of work and
home was an idealized, prescriptive account, in which cultural norms
about sex and economics infused the way in which the world was being
portrayed., 38 This vision purported to describe the world as it was and it
therefore "characterize[d] families without the preferred family-market
ordering as deviant, abnormal, and personally at fault., 39 The threat
posed by these "deviant" families can be seen in the "legal regimes that
were created beginning in the Nineteenth Century to regulate failed
fathers and the women and children whose status turned on this
evaluation of the men who headed or were supposed to head their
households. ' 4° Child protection societies were given "unprecedented
35 Tonya Plank, How Would the Criminal Law Treat Sethe? Reflections of
Patriarchy, Child Abuse, and the Uses of Narrative to Re-Imagine Motherhood,
12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 96n. 62 (1997).
36 Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie TM.
Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal
Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1405, 1413 n.39 (2002).
One study of white families in Philadelphia in 1880, for example,
discovered that the children of Irish-born men earned between thirty-eight
and forty-six percent of their households' total income, while their peers
with German-born fathers earned between thirty-three and thirty- five
percent, and the children of native-born fathers earned between twenty-
eight and thirty-two percent.
Jill E. Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 325 (2002).
37 Hasday, supra note 37, at 325.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 326.
40 d. at 328.
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legal authority to scrutinize .. targeted families, remove their children,
and arrest their parents. ' 41 Such families were a threat and these
"protection societies" were there to force them to become more like
middle class American families or dismantle them if they would not.
The temperance movement, with its strong nativist undertones42 was
simply another way of alleviating the perceived threat posed by these
"deviant" immigrant families. "In the culture of the Irish ... use of
whisky or beer was customary and often a stable part of the diet. 43 The
Irish immigrants' acceptance of alcohol was considered one of the main
reasons for their poverty,44 and it was their excessive poverty that made
it necessary for Irish women and children to work and therefore violate
Victorian family values. In addition, unemployed Irish men helped fuel
the increasingly worrisome male drinking culture that was separating
men from their families.45
One of the main goals of temperance movement was to reverse this
trend towards family separation. The temperance movement hoped to
revitalize the family, and temperance advocates believed that temperance
would help "to support and protect the family, and to return the husband
... to the home.' ' 6 The perceived importance in achieving this goal can
be seen in the fact that even though the Nineteenth Century was the
height of the separate spheres ideology, which taught that that there were
separate spheres for men and women, female temperance advocates
believed they were justified in actively attempting to transform the male
space of the saloon.47 These advocates ignored convention and invaded
the male saloon, arguing that the only way to "protect their own spaces
41 Id. at 333.
42 "If the lowly Irish... were the drinkers and the drunkards of the community,
then it was more necessary than ever that the aspirant to middle class
membership not risk the possibility that he might be classed with the
immigrants." JOSEPH R. GUSFELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT, 51(1966).
43 Id.
14 Id. at 55.
45 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 33.
46 Kingsdale, supra note 29, at 487.
47 Richard H. Chused, Gendered Space, 42 FLA. L. REv. 125, 131, n.23 (1990).
"Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries some spaces
typically occupied by middle-class men and women became increasingly
gendered... [a]s the nineteenth century unfolded, workplaces began splitting off
from homes, women became domestically isolated with their children."
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from rapacious men was to transform the content of men's spaces ....- A8
In pursuit of this goal women tore at the foundation of the separate
spheres ideology imposing their sphere of family and the home on the
male saloon by invading it with their prayers and protests as they
attempted to get men to come directly home after work.4 9 These women
hoped to break down the separation between men and their families
perpetuated by the saloon and start a "new awakening to the values of
the home."
'
The temperance advocates' fear of the saloon and its impact on the
family was not unfounded. The saloon was a threat to more than just the
idealized vision of the family. The perception that the saloon destroyed
families was based on reality. "The nineteenth-century drunkard's
reputation as a wife beater, child abuser, and sodden, irresponsible non-
provider was not undeserved.",51 "[T]emperance workers ... who were
well aware of the social problems that stemmed from alcohol and
drunkenness and their aim was broader than simply regulating moral
behavior., 52 They were "fighting against the rape and battering of
victims of all ages, against deprivation of needed food, drink, clothing,
not to mention respect, kindness, health, independence. 53 The push for
Prohibition was in part recognition of the seriousness of these dangers as
well as an acknowledgement that earlier legislative measures had been
inadequate to deal with the problem.
State legislative attempts to deal with the threat to the family posed
by intemperate husbands in terms of both physical and financial harm
can be seen in statutes such as New York's "Dram Shop Act,, 5 4 which
"gave to every person injured in person, property, or means of support
by any intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any
person a right of action against any person who by selling intoxicating
48 Id. at 133.
4 91d. at 132.
50 
id.
51 RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND
LIBERTY, 1873-1900, 3-4 (1981).
52 Kristen E. Kandt, Historical essay: In the Name of God; An American Story of
Feminism, Racism and Religious Intolerance, the Story of Alma Bridewell White, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 753, 792 n.347 (2000).
53 MARY DALY, PuR-E LUST 286 (1983).
54 N.Y. Civ. RTS. L. §16 (1954). The current version of the act is at N.Y. Gen.
Oblig. L. § 11-101 (McKinney 2003) but only applies to the unlawful sale of
liquor.
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liquors has caused the intoxication in whole or in part. 55 In other states,
Dram Shop statutes were even more explicit in their concern for families
of drunken men. For example, the Alabama Dram Shop Act specifically
delineated this right first and foremost as the right of a drunkard's
"wife," "child" or "parent., 56 The purpose of dram shop laws was to
give the family of the injured drunkard or the family injured by the
drunkard a right of action against the saloon keeper who got him drunk.57
Although such legislation strained the legal definition of proximate
cause, the danger that male drinking posed to families was seen as
overriding such concerns. 8
Interestingly, although most temperance advocates spoke out against
the evils of alcohol, they did not actually view the primary threat to the
family as one caused by alcohol per se. Instead, they believed the
disintegration of the family was caused the culture of the saloon, which
was at least as big a draw as was the actual alcohol being served. The
urban working-class saloon was "the poor man's club." It offered men a
welcome escape from the harsh realities of their everyday lives. These
men had "no access to the well-appointed hotel bars and exclusive clubs
that offered recreation to the salaried and professional men.",59 "For men
who worked in sweaty often dangerous jobs and lived in crowed, stuffy
tenements, the saloon beckoned as a warm, well-lit, pleasant refuge for
relaxation and masculine companionships. 6 ° Inside, men "played cards,
read newspapers, discussed politics, sports and theology.' Many
55 Note, Torts: Proximate Cause: Statute Establishing Cause OfAction: Daggett
v. Keshner, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 818 (1955).
56 ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (2003) The Code states that:
Every wife, child, parent, or other person who shall be injured in
person, property, or means of support by any intoxicated person or in
consequence of the intoxication of any person shall have a right of
action against any person who shall, by selling, giving, or otherwise
disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors
or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person for all damages
actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.
Id.
57 See supra note 56.
58 The continuing concern between alcohol and the family can be seen in the
fact that that many of these dram shop acts, or slight variations of them, are still
good law.
59 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 104.
60 /d.
61 Id.
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saloons had "pool tables or pianos [and] occasionally, there was an
attached gymnasium, bowling alley or handball court. 62  It was the
desire to be a part of this culture that led "the fathers of young children
[to] float[] away a week's wages that could have gone to food, clothing,
and education," that allowed addiction [to] enslave[] many a man,
insulating him from the lifestyle of decency and responsibility," and that
lured these men "into a blurred phantasmagoria of whores, drug fiends,
pimps, thieves, and gamblers. 63
The unique threat posed by the saloon, as distinct from alcohol
alone, is demonstrated by the relative unconcern with which other types
of drinking establishments were viewed in the pre-Prohibition period.
Although not as numerous, there were exceptions to the masculine
saloon such as ethnic bars, clubs and beer gardens that invited families.64
These drinking establishments, though by far in the minority, never had
the worrisome connotations of the saloon because they were places that
encouraged family activity and togetherness.65
C POST-REPEAL CONCERN WITH ALCOHOL AS A THREAT TO THE FAMILY
The perceived difference in the threat between family friendly
alcohol establishments and male dominated saloons did not end with
repeal. The continued recognition of this distinction can be seen in post-
62 Id.
63 CLARK surpa note 6, at 2.
64 PEGRAM supra note 1, at 56.
65 Id. "[T]he beer garden provided something which most immigrant-
Americans could not get anywhere else-something the Germans called
gemutlichkeit." Loosely translated, gemutlichkeit means "a sort of cozy, warm
state of being created only by the presence of good friends, close family, a
relaxing environment, and, more often than not, plenty of beer." However, "the
typical beer garden offered far more than just beer and gemutlichkeit. There
was music, dancing, sport and leisure." A visit to the beer garden was an
"occasion for the whole family, and one which usually lasted the entire day,
from sunup to sundown. Indeed, for the mostly working class throngs who
came, the beer garden was an oasis in an otherwise workaday life. As such, it
played an important role in the lives of countless immigrants." Carl H. Miller,
The Rise of the Beer Barons (1999),
http://www.beerhistory.com/library/holdings/beerbarons.shtml (last visited
March 30, 2006).
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Prohibition legislation such as The Michigan Beer Bill,66 passed
immediately after the Repeal of Prohibition, which prohibited bars, but
permitted the operation of establishments such as beer gardens. 67 Such
legislation demonstrates that even after repeal there was a continuing
desire to eliminate the drinking culture of the saloon. At the same time,
it also shows that this concern did not extend to drinking establishments
like beer gardens, which have traditionally been family oriented.68 The
Michigan Beer Bill was passed only to prevent the return of the saloon;
it specifically allowed the return of other types of drinking
establishments.
The Michigan Beer Bill was not unique. Similar legislation was
passed by numerous other states after the repeal of Prohibition and in
many instances such statutes remained good law until it was quite certain
that the old time saloon could never return. For instance, post-repeal
legislation in Texas prohibited 'open saloons,' until 1971. It was only
then "that 'liquor by the drink,' was legalized finally by constitutional
amendment., 69 Texas legislators appear to have had the same concern as
those in Michigan regarding the return of the saloon. 70 Although Texas
bars that sold liquor by the drink were banned for decades after repeal,
beer parlors71  were allowed to return almost immediately.
72
66 See Thomas H. Walters, Note, Michigan 's New Brewpub License: Regulation
of Zymurgy for the Twenty-First Century, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 621 ,643
(1994).67 Id. at 644.
68 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 105 ("In a class of its own was the German beer
garden, which flourished in leafy suburbs and the occasional urban green oasis.
For the entry fee.., a customer was admitted to an extensive landscaped garden
with a bandstand and open-air tables to which waiters brought drinks. Some
beer gardens could accommodate several thousand visitors; entire families came
for music and dinner."); see also supra note 65.
69 Mark Davidson, "Let's Go Across the Street for a Cold One! ": The Harris
County Courthouse Square Over the Years, HOUSTON LAWYER, Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 48.
70 The almost hysterical concern about the return of the saloon can be seen in
some of the more outlandish legislation such as laws which outlawed swinging
doors in bars or laws which required that "bar stools be provided for all patrons
since it was thought that standing at the bar- a venerable saloon tradition-
promoted excessive drinking." Carl Miller, We got Beer Back, ALL ABOUT
BEER, http://www.allaboutbeer.com/features/216gotbeer.html (last visited
March 30, 2006).
7' Beer parlors do not sell hard liquor and typically tend to sell food. In many
ways they are more similar to restaurants than to saloons. Courts frequently
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Furthermore, the fact that this was a continuing concern with the saloon
rather than liquor, (as opposed to beer), can been seen in the fact that
long after repeal many states continued to prohibit "open salons" yet
allowed "private clubs" to sell liquor to their guests. 73 The primary
concern with liquor continued to be with the manner in which it was sold
not the actual sale.
As stated above, in the period before Prohibition there was a widely
recognized distinction between saloons which catered to solitary men,
and clubs or beer gardens which catered to families. Whereas the saloon
was deeply feared and the desire for its elimination was one of the
driving forces behind the move for Prohibition, clubs and beer gardens
never raised the same concerns. When viewed in light of this history,
the seemingly unsupportable distinction made by the Missouri
legislature and upheld by the Eighth Circuit in Spudich is
understandable. Even today, pool halls are rarely family establishments,
and many have the same undesirable qualities as the old saloon.74
combine the two terms when describing such locations. See e.g., Aubin v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 185 Cal. App. 2d 658, 660 (1960) ("Ocotillo Gardens, a
restaurant and beer parlor located near Desert Center ").
72 Davidson, supra note 69.
73 See e.g., Swain, supra note 29, at 334 n.74 (in Kansas "'private club'
arrangements were created to serve liquor to club members and circumvent the
prohibition on open saloons" and this arrangement was later sanctioned by the
legislature under the Private Club Licensing Act of 1965. "This Act authorized
the consumption of alcoholic liquor on the premises of private clubs as
consumption 'in a place which the general public has no access,' and placed a
minimum membership fee and waiting requirement on private club members."
By enacting these requirements the legislature ensured that liquor would be
available to those who wanted it but that these clubs would not become saloons.
74 The continued seediness of pool halls can be gleaned from a quick
examination of newspaper articles and criminal case law. The number of
criminal incidents that occur in or around pool halls continues to be high. The
following are just a small sample of the numerous crimes that have recently
occurred within pool halls. See e.g., One Dead, Two Wounded in Pool Hall
Shooting, WSBTV.com, March 13, 2006,
http://www.wsbtv.com/news/7955178/detail.html; Second Arrest Made in
Raleigh Pool Hall Shooting, WRAL.com, January 10, 2006,
http://www.wral.com/news/5971244/detail.html; Overnight Shooting in Pool
Hall Parking Lot, KRISTV.Com, July 14, 2005,
http://www.kristv.com/Global/story.asp?S=3594388. See also United States v.
Wright, 131 F.3d 1111, 1112 (1997), (a narcotics dealer attempted to escape the
police by fleeing into a pool hall); Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 845 (1997), (the
police uncovered an illegal gambling ring run out of a pool hall, the owners of
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Therefore, the court's distinction between family and non-family
drinking establishments is justifiable, as is the court's conclusion that
pool halls with liquor licenses present concerns not relevant to family
establishments that sell alcohol.
II. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LIQUOR AND SEX
A. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER SEXAND ALCOHOL
In the recent case of Sammy's of Mobile v. City of Mobile, Ltd. , the
Eleventh Circuit held that nude dancing and alcohol are an especially
dangerous combination that justifies increased state regulation. As a
result, the Sammy's of Mobile court upheld state laws banning nude
dancing in places selling alcohol. Many scholars found the Sammy's of
Mobile decision outrageous. These critics argued that the police power
alone does not satisfactorily justify the regulations7 6 at issue in Sammy's
of Mobile. According to one appalled commentator, "the government
did not present one fact to demonstrate that Sammy's of Mobile had a
problem with sexual assault, prostitution or any other 'secondary effect
of nude dancing' significant enough to justify limiting free speech."
7
Another distraught critic described the decision as blatant "censorship,
based on the particular moral taste of the legislature" and "upheld behind
a smoke screen of inherently flawed balancing tests. '78 According to
this critic, "[b]ecause the reviewing court agreed with the moral position
of the legislature, it failed to realize its purpose as an unbiased protector
of the Constitution.
79
The reason there is such controversy over cases like Sammy's of
Mobile is that there is serious disagreement over whether the Twenty-
First Amendment applies to nude dancing regulations. If the Twenty-
First Amendment can be applied to nude dancing, then the question of
the State's authority to regulate nude dancing and alcohol sales
disappears. However, recent Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate
the pool hall then hired a hit man to kill the deputy sheriff who had arrested
him), and Quiles v. City of New York, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14238, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2003). (the victim was shot dead inside a pool hall).
" 140 F.3d 993, 996-97 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
76 The regulations required the dancers to wear a G-string and pasties. Id. at 999
n.10.
77 Kevin R. Bruning, Note, Nudity and Alcohol: Morality Lies in Public
Discussion, 29 STETSON L. REv. 775, 796 (2000).78 Id. at 776.
79 Id,
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that the Twenty-First Amendment cannot be used to regulate nude
dancing, although for decades courts had been upholding such
regulations based on the power granted to states under the Twenty-First
Amendment. As a result, state and federal courts are now struggling
over the constitutionality of nude dancing regulations, and those courts
that continue to uphold these regulations are frequently criticized, even
though such criticisms may be unwarranted. Despite the Court's
decision in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island,80 discussed below, the
history and purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment may justify its
continued application in the nude dancing context and bolster the
constitutionality of ongoing state efforts to regulate the perceived threat
of alcohol and nude dancing.
B. THE SUPREME COURTAND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NUDE DANCING REGULATIONS
The controversy over the constitutionality of using the Twenty-First
Amendment to regulate nude dancing began in California v. La Rue.
81
In La Rue, the Supreme Court upheld state regulations prohibiting nude
dancing in establishments licensed to serve alcohol. According to
Justice Rehnquist, "the broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has
been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state
authority over public health, welfare, and morals."82 As a result, the
LaRue court upheld that state's use of the Twenty-First Amendment to
regulate nude dancing. Scholars writing on the La Rue decision were
frequently critical of this holding, arguing that there was no justification
for what they believed was a significant infringement of First
Amendment rights. Such scholars believed the evidence of rampant
illegal sexual behavior 3 that the Court cited to justify its decision was
unpersuasive. These critics further argued that even if the allegations of
such behavior, including rape and attempted rape, were true, there were
better methods of preventing such behavior than infringing on the
dancers' free speech rights. For example, one commentator appeared
baffled that the Court upheld such regulation when "less restrictive
means ... such as the exclusion of already inebriated patrons from the
10517 U.S. 484 (1996).
81 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
82 /d. at 114.
83Id. at 111.
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premises," were available.84  Such critics did not recognize the
combination of sex and alcohol as a particularly serious threat.
The Court, however, at least for a time, saw the connection between
illicit sexuality and alcohol as obvious and extremely worrisome. After
La Rue, the Court decided New York State Liquor Authority v.
Bellanca,85 in which the Court upheld a ban on nude barroom dancing,
stating that its decision was based on the "common sense" notion that
"any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in a public place begets
undesirable behavior., 8 6 Lastly, in City of Newport v. Iacobucci,87 the
Court once again upheld a municipal ban on nude dancing.88 The Court
reaffirmed Bellanca and LaRue, stating that "the interest in maintaining
order outweighs the interest in free expression by dancing nude. 89
Although the Supreme Court described the threat of alcohol and sex
as one confirmed by "common experience" and "common sense," 90
many scholars disagreed; however, their criticisms ignored the pre-
Prohibition experience dealing with the problems of alcohol and sex.
Critics of the LaRue line of cases typically disparaged the Court for what
they believed was a value judgment that speech in bars deserves less
protection than other forms of speech. They also unjustifiably dismissed
the argument that such regulations increase public health or safety. One
critic asserted that what the Court really meant by "common sense" was
the belief that "expression in an environment of alcohol consumption is
not sufficiently valuable to merit vigorous constitutional protection." 91
Another commentator criticized LaRue and its progeny for holding that
the interest in maintaining order and preventing crime outweighs any
First Amendment interest in nude dancing and added that "[t]he same
logic that allows states to proscribe striptease dancing in bars could also
allow the states to ban the reading of politically controversial
84 Faust, supra note 13, at 751 n.32. (Although it appears not to have registered
with this critic, the expulsion of drunk patrons trying to engage in illicit sexual
behavior is an extremely ill-advised way of dealing with such behavior and is
not truly a viable alternative.)
5 452 U.S. 714 (1981).86 Id. at 718.
87 479 U.S. 92 (1986).
88 Id. at 94-95.
89 Id. at 97.
90 The Court refers to the belief in the danger of combining alcohol and sex as
part of the "common experience," California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115-16
(1972), or based upon "common sense," Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 718.
91 Faust, supra note 13, at 753.
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newspapers in bars. 9 2 Such criticisms ignore the history and purpose
behind the Twenty-First Amendment.
The concerns that motivated the state regulations in LaRue were
exactly the same concerns that led to the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment in the first place. In LaRue, the Court found that customers
had "engaged in oral copulation, and.. . had masturbated in public., 93 It
also found that "prostitution, rape and attempted rape had taken place in
and around the establishments. 94  Similar types of illegal sexual
behavior were widespread in pre-Prohibition drinking establishments
and it was the desire to put a stop to such behavior that was another
major motivating factor behind the temperance movement and
Prohibition.
C. THE SEXUAL A TMOSPHERE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SALOON
In the pre-Prohibition period, the saloon had a well established
tradition of combining heavy drinking with sexual deviancy. Prohibition
was a response not simply to the dangers of drinking, but also to the
sexual impropriety that was encouraged in many pre-Prohibition saloons.
Temperance advocates believed that the "saloon excite[d] sexual
passions which would not have been aroused by drinking under other
conditions." 95 In the late Nineteenth Century, "the atmosphere of many
urban saloons drifted toward a libidinous haze. It became one of raw
masculinity, of muted or blunt sexuality. 96  Attempts to lessen the
sexual atmosphere of the saloon frequently resulted in legislation
prohibiting women from having any association with saloons. Such
statutes both prohibited "the employment of women in any saloon,
theater or other place where liquor was sold"97 and often actually barred
women from even entering saloons in order to "protect[] women and
enforce[] high morals. 98 Not surprisingly, such regulations actually had
92 Lisa Malmer, Comment, Nude Dancing and the First Amendment, 59 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1275, 1276, 1306 (1991).
9 Id. at 1282.94 
Id.
95 CLARK, supra note 6, at 59.96 Id. at61.
97 Blanche Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 5 B.U. L.
REv. 723, 745 (1935).
98 Heidi C. Paulson, Ladies Night Discounts: Should We Bar Them or Promote
Them?, 32 B. C. L. REV. 494 (1991).
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the opposite effect than what was intended. They simply kept
"respectable" women out of the saloon.99
As a result, the only women in saloons were prostitutes. Many
saloon keepers actually encouraged the presence of prostitutes, others
had arrangements with nearby brothels and still others actually became
pimps.10° The connection between alcohol and sex was present in even
the most upscale establishments where "[p]aintings of female nudes gave
a hint of illicit sexuality to even the best hotel bars."''° However, it was
the low-grade places, with their "curtained 'wine rooms,' upstairs
bedrooms and the presence of prostitutes [that] confirmed to worried
observers the connection between alcohol and sexual transgression.'
0 2
The growth of prostitution in the United States paralleled the growth
of the saloon.'0 3  In the pre-Prohibition period prostitution was
increasing at alarming rates10 4 and in many ways, the push for the
Eighteenth Amendment was as much a result of the desire to regulate
99 In fact, these regulations were so effective in this respect that belief in the
questionable character of women who entered bars persisted long after the
repeal of Prohibition. See, for example, the gang rape of a woman in a New
Bedford bar and the protests that the accompanied the conviction of the rapists.
Protestors argued that a flirtatious woman gets what she deserves, questioning
her presence in a bar, stating that "[s]he should have been home in the first
place." The protestors argued that victim "did after all enter a barroom, drink
and flirt." The community believed that the rapists' punishment should be
lessened because the victim visited a bar. Editorial, The Shame in New Bedford
and Dallas; It's Not the Victim Who Should Be Tried for Rape, N.Y. TIMES,
March 28, 1984, at A26.
100 CLARK, supra note 6, at 62.
101 PEGRAM, supra note 1, at 56.
102 Id. During this period, the only women to "frequent saloons openly were
prostitutes." As custom became entrenched, any woman who entered a saloon
was assumed to be of dubious character." This connection became so engrained
that when temperance reformers "tried to enter saloons to record the conditions
of drinkers," they were called "whores." Mary Murphy, Bootlegging Mothers
and Drinking Daughters: Gender and Prohibition in Butte Montana, 46
AMERICAN QUARTERLY, 174, 181 (1994). The belief in the sinful influence of
the saloon is further demonstrated by legislation which made it a crime for
women to enter saloons and compelled saloon owners to dismantle any
accommodations they had made for female patrons. Id. at 181-82.
103 CLARK, supra note 6, at 63.
104 CLARK , supra note 6, at 56-57. For instance, in "1902 in Spokane forty
salons had 'wineroom' attachments which left rather little to the imagination."
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this illicit sexual behavior as it was to regulate alcohol consumption. °5
During the period before National Prohibition, "it was almost impossible
to distinguish the anti-saloon movement from the social protest against
organized prostitution.
'" 10 6
D. NUDE DANCE CLUBS AS THE MODERN DAYSALOON
While the pre-Prohibition concern with the unrestrained and deviant
sexuality of the old saloon seems inappropriate in the context of modem
day bars, it actually appears quite apt when used in relation to nude
dancing establishments. One could argue that in many ways, strip clubs
are the contemporary equivalent of the old saloon. These establishments
have all the worrisome aspects of the Nineteenth Century saloon and,
therefore, the temperance movement's special concern with alcohol and
sexuality continues to have extreme relevance in this context. Like the
old saloon, the patrons in nude dancing clubs are almost exclusively
male, the atmosphere is highly sexualized, excessive drinking is
encouraged and prostitution is a frequent occurrence. 10 7 In addition, the
volume of sexually based crimes that occur in these locations is also
deeply disturbing. 0 8  Like the Nineteenth Century temperance
advocates, many modern day communities with nude dancing
establishments believe that preventing the sale of alcohol in these clubs
would reduce the frequency of these crimes. They believe that "the
combination of nude dancing and alcoholic inebriation increases to an
105 Id. at 63.
'061d. at 64.
107 For the connection between sex and alcohol in these establishments see, for
example, United States v. Campione where, for the price of two drinks, patrons
could watch the nude dancing and were also presented with the opportunity to
"mix", i.e. spend time with the dancers, which frequently included sex. In order
to have more privacy with a dancer patrons would go to the booth area, or the
back room, where patrons were required to buy a bottle of liquor for between
$200.00 and $700.00. 942 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1991). The more alcohol they
bought, the more "privacy" and opportunities for sexual intercourse they
received. Id.
108 See e.g., Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 945 n.3 (l1th
Cir. 1982) ("The offenses occurring in and around the Booby Trap included
homicide, narcotics, robbery, prostitution, lewdness, larceny, assault, battery,
drunk and disorderly, and solicitation. In addition, a police department record of
police calls to the Booby Trap included several references to rapes, prostitution
by Booby Trap employees, and fights between the tavern's patrons.").
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unacceptable level the likelihood of illegal and/or disorderly conduct,"'
0 9
and they point to the high level of sexual assaults that occur in or around
nude dancing establishments selling alcohol to support to their
argument. "0
These contemporary arguments regarding nude dancing clubs sound
very similar to the anti-saloon arguments made by Nineteenth Century
temperance advocates."' In addition, there are many other similarities
between the saloon and the strip club. Like the saloon, nude dancing
clubs also cause great harm to families. This harm is demonstrated by
the number of divorce cases involving husbands who frequented these
clubs. 12 There are numerous instances of husbands racking up huge
debts at strip clubs," 3 and even more disturbing are the cases where
these debts led men to assault or even murder their wives. 1
4
109 Richter v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 559 F.2d 1168, 1173 (9th
Cir. 1977).
110 The connection between alcohol and such crimes can be seen in the case of
the Oasis club which was not permitted to sell alcohol and initially complied
with the law after receiving a citation for violating it. While the club complied
with the law there were no sexual assault incidents but just when the police
began to suspect that the club was once again selling alcohol a female dancer at
the club claimed that she had been raped by a male patron. State ex rel. Woodall
v. D&L Co., Inc., No. W1999-00925-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 357,
at *5, *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2001).
"' On the occasion of the opening of a strip club in Shreveport, LA, one
woman wrote into the paper: "You women better get your divorce papers ready
because the strip club is coming." Tell the Times, TIMES (Shreveport, LA), Sept.
21, 2002, at 6D.
112 See e.g., Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40, 63 (Tex. App. 2002) (discovering that her
husband had been frequenting strip clubs once a week for years, wife filed for divorce).
113 In Beard, it was estimated that the husband had spent over $12,600 at strip
clubs. Id. at 64. Similarly, in Mantle v. Sterry, the husband spent more than
$75,000 at strip clubs in the year before the parties divorced. No. 02 AP-286,
2003 Ohio 6058, at 29 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003).
114 In one case a man strangled his wife to hide debts from nude dancing clubs.
Alabama, USA TODAY, June 6, 1991, at 8A. In another a man left his wife so
he could continue to lavish expensive gifts on a strip club dancer but when she
tired of him she devised a plan to murder his wife and frame him for it so his
money would go to her. Larry Celona, Eric Lenkowitz & Tracy Connor, Go-Go
Girls Gaga Fantasies: Slay Plot Stripper Told of "Bonnie and Clyde" Goals,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at 008.
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E. ADDRESSING THE LARUE CRITICISMS
The similarities between the saloon and modem nude dancing
establishments demonstrate how pre-Prohibition concerns with sex and
alcohol may still have important significance today. For example, one of
the common criticisms of the LaRue line of cases was a slippery slope
argument which warned that allowing the Twenty-First Amendment to
justify the regulation of nude dancing could easily lead to state
regulation of all sorts of speech, from poetry to politics, which occurs in
any establishment selling liquor. According to this argument, "[t]he
same logic that allows states to proscribe striptease dancing in bars could
also allow the states to ban the reading of politically controversial
newspapers in bars." 115 However, such arguments ignore the special,
historic concern with alcohol and sex; a connection which tends to cast
doubt on these slippery slope arguments. When viewed in this context it
is easy to see why such regulation would be confined to sexual acts, but
not other forms of controversial speech.
In Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 16 the Seventh Circuit specifically
addressed the question of whether the Twenty-First Amendment could
be used to regulate other forms of speech in bars and the court's answer
was a resounding "no." The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
ruling that had upheld the village's ban on live rock music played in
bars. 1 7 The Village of Shorewood court found that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not justify this restriction on free speech. The court
reached this decision despite the fact that there was "uncontested
evidence of frequent disturbances at the plaintiffs' bar."1 8  The
distinction drawn by the Shorewood court between the use of the
Twenty-First Amendment to regulate sexual speech, but not other kinds
of speech, is justified in light of the temperance movement's concern
with sex and alcohol. These concerns were incorporated into the
Twenty-First Amendment and therefore, states should be able to use this
Amendment to regulate sexual speech, but not other forms of speech.
115 Malmer, supra note 92, at 1306. "The Court could easily extend this
reasoning to say that the twenty-first amendment outweighs all first amendment
rights in establishments that serve liquor. The power to outlaw liquor altogether
does not necessarily imply the power to ignore the first Amendment in
establishments serving liquor. So long as the states allow bars to operate, they
should not be permitted to violate the first Amendment rights of those who own
and patronize them." Id.
116 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983).
ll 7 Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 11.
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F. THE 44 LIQUORMART DECISION
The history of the temperance movement and the push for
Prohibition demonstrates why the Twenty-First Amendment should
continue to support nude dancing regulations and why 44 Liquormart
was wrongly decided. In 44 Liquormart, a case concerning the
regulation of commercial speech, the Supreme Court held that the
Twenty-First Amendment did not justify nude dancing regulations." 9
The issue in 44 Liquormart was whether a law prohibiting alcohol price
advertisements violated the First Amendment. 20 The 44 Liquormart
Court reaffirmed the outcome in LaRue, but held that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not outweigh the First Amendment and could not be
used to regulate commercial speech. The Court explained that "the
Twenty-First Amendment does not qualify the constitutional prohibition
against laws abridging the freedom of speech embodied in the First
Amendment."' 12' However, the Court also stated that its 44 Liquormart
decision did not affect the outcome in LaRue or similar types of cases,
because such regulation could be achieved through the state's police
power.122 The Court stated that, "[e]ntirely apart from the Twenty-first
Amendment, the State has ample power to prohibit the sale of alcoholic
beverages in inappropriate locations. Moreover, in subsequent cases, the
Court has recognized that a state's inherent police powers "provide
ample authority to restrict the kind of 'bacchanalian revelries' described
in the LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are
involved."'
2 3
The holding in 44 Liquormart was the Court's answer to the
criticisms of LaRue that the use of the Twenty-First Amendment to
regulate nude dancing was the beginning of a slippery slope that could
lead to drastic infringements on free speech. The 44 Liquormart
decision made it clear that the Twenty-First Amendment would never
become a backdoor method of allowing censorship. However, in its
attempts to make sure that the Twenty-First Amendment could not be
used to regulate other forms of speech, the 44 Liquormart court threw
the baby out with the bathwater. A look to the history and concerns of
the temperance movement would have provided the Court with a way to
"9 517 US 484 (1996).
120 Id. at 489.
121 Id. at 516.
122 Id at 515.
123 Id. at 515.
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draw a principled distinction between nude dancing and other forms of
speech and therefore allowed courts to continue using the Twenty-First
Amendment to regulate nude dancing.
Commercial speech is very different from nude dancing and there is
nothing in the history of the Prohibition movement or repeal that would
suggest that temperance advocates were concerned with regulating
commercial speech. Although the 44 Liquormart court stated that the
Twenty-First Amendment has no bearing on the First Amendment, given
the history and purpose behind the Twenty-First Amendment, there is a
strong reason to distinguish between sexual speech and other kinds of
speech in the context of alcohol regulation. This is especially true given
the fact that despite what the Court said in 44 Liquormart, it is not at all
certain that state police powers are always sufficient to prevent the types
of incidents that occurred in LaRue.
Although the 44 Liquormart court stated that the Twenty-First
Amendment is not needed to regulate the bacchanalian revelries
described in the LaRue because the states's police powers alone are
sufficient to prevent such behavior, 124 the Court also made it clear that
the Twenty-First Amendment may not be used to infringe Freedom of
Speech, thus implying it may not be used to regulate nude dancing.
125
As a result, problems arise when the First Amendment and the state
police powers come into conflict, and there are numerous cases which
refute the 44 Liquormart court's statement that state police powers will
always be sufficient to prevent the unwanted effects of alcohol and nude
dancing.
For example, in Vaughn v. St. Helena Parish Police Jury,126 the
district court held that the state's police power did not give the state the
right to combat the secondary effects of nude dancing and alcohol by
prohibiting completely nude dancing in bars. The statute prohibited "the
holder of a retail or wholesale dealer license from permitting 'any nude
or partially nude person' on the premises," but all this meant was that
dancers were required to wear a G-string and pasties. 127 Nonetheless,
124 id.
125 Id.
126 192 F. Supp. 2d 562 (W.D. L.a. 2001).
127 Id. at 567. The statute defined "nude" as "a person who is less than
completely or opaquely covered such as to expose to view that person's genitals
and/or pubic region, all of the buttocks area or the female breast area below a
point immediately above the top of the areola." Id. at 567.
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the Vaughn court held that such a restriction was overbroad and was
therefore an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. As a result, the
state was not able to use its police powers to the extent it believed
necessary to prevent the harmful effects of nude dancing in drinking
establishments.
Similarly, in G.Q. Gentlemen's Quarters, Inc. v. City of Lake
Ozark,2 8 the court was highly unreceptive to the city's argument
regarding the harmful "secondary effects" of nude dancing in bars.
Although the court stated that "the government's burden ... is not great"
the court found it was not met and that subsequently, the city could not
use its police powers to regulate nude dancing.' 29 In fact, the level of
proof required by the court was actually quite high considering the fact
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly implied that it is common sense to
conclude that combining alcohol and sex will produce negative
effects. 30 However, the G.Q. court did not believe this connection was
obvious, holding that while "the City claims in its brief on appeal that
the purpose of enacting Ordinance No. 99-7 was to combat harmful
secondary effects, nothing in the record indicated that this was the
governmental purpose of the ordinance.'' 3 The court wanted significant
proof that alcohol and sex produce harmful secondary effects and
without it, the court found the statute prohibiting nude dancing
unconstitutional. In the absence of such proof, the GQ court held that
the city's police powers were insufficient to regulate nude dancing.
In R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford,132 the Seventh Circuit also
demanded significant proof that combining sex and alcohol produces
negative effects. The RVS court held that there was no basis for the city
council to have found that exotic dancing produces harmful secondary
effects because "the City Council did not rely on any studies from other
towns or conduct any of their own studies regarding the relationship
between Exotic Dancing Nightclubs and undesirable 'secondary
effects."",133 The court reached this conclusion despite minutes from the
128 83 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
129 Id. at 102.
13o See e.g., Ben"s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 , 725-26 (7th
Cir. 2003); Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-39 (2002); City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438-39 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97 (2000).
13' 83 S.W.3d 98 at 102.
132 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.2004).
'13 Id. at 405.
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city council's meeting revealing the council's concern and experience
with the negative secondary effects of nude dancing and alcohol, 34 as
well as the testimony of a crime expert showing the connection between
nude dancing establishments and secondary effects such as
prostitution. 135 Despite such evidence, the court still found that there
was not enough evidence of harmful secondary effects to uphold the
ordinance under the government's police powers.1
36
Such cases demonstrate that the state police power has not always
been considered enough to justify the regulation of nude dancing in bars.
This conclusion is further supported by Supreme Court cases like
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,137 in which the Court has held that state
police powers often do not give states the right to regulate demonstrably
dangerous speech. In Lorillard Tobacco, the Court held that the state's
police powers did not give it the power to regulate smokeless tobacco
and cigar advertising in the manner the state believed would best reduce
the incidence of childhood and adolescent smoking. The Court reached
this conclusion even though it held that the state had "provided ample
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco
and cigars.' 38  Despite this finding, as well as the Court's
acknowledgement that "limiting youth exposure to advertising will
decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars," 39 the Court
still held that the regulation violated the First Amendment. What a case
like Lorillard Tobacco shows is that the state police powers do not
clearly allow the regulation of speech that produces harmful effects
when such regulation conflicts with the First Amendment. Therefore,
the Court's statement in 44 Liquormart, that the regulations at issue in
134 The minutes stated that:
It is the City's experience that [Exotic Dancing Nightclubs] in a
concentrated area or near residential uses attract[ ] prostitution and
other problems that are part of this atmosphere. Alderman Mark stated
there have been incidents where liquor sales were procured with the
intent of establishing dancing clubs. The proposed text Amendments
would allow the City more control over the location of these type
of clubs to prevent adverse effects on adjoining neighborhoods.
Id. at 405-06.
"' Id. at 407-08.
116 Id. at 412.
"' 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
138 Id. at 561.
139 id.
[Vol. 13:3
2006] Why We Are Still Feeling the Effects of Prohibition 579
LaRue could have been accomplished through the state's police power,
is not nearly as obvious as it first appears.
G. A BETTER SOLUTION
The 44 Liquormart Court was concerned with the potential use of
the Twenty-First Amendment to curb free speech, but in solving one
problem the Court created another. By stating that the Twenty-First
Amendment did not abridge Freedom of Speech, and thus by implication
nude dancing, the Court ignored the history and lessons of the
temperance movement which had unquestionably demonstrated the
special problems of combining alcohol and sex and the importance of
regulating this combination. A possible solution to this dilemma would
have been for the 44 Liquormart Court to hold that although the Twenty-
First Amendment does not qualify the First Amendment it does increase
the constitutionality of a state using its police power to regulate alcohol
and sex. Such a holding would have prevented the Twenty-First
Amendment from being used to curb other forms of speech while at the
same time insuring that state police powers would be strong enough to
curb the secondary effects of combining alcohol and nude dancing.
This solution would avoid the current situation in which post-
Liquormart courts are struggling to justify nude dancing regulations
under inadequate police powers. In Sammy's of Mobile, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the 44 Liquormart decision to support its holding that
such regulation was constitutional under the state's general police
powers. However, in Sammy's of Mobile, the court is quite clearly
struggling with the idea that the police power alone justifies such
regulation. For the dissent, such a conclusion is impossible. The dissent
argued that without the Twenty-First Amendment justification the
rational of LaRue is "eviscerated."'' 40 The majority disagreed, but their
desire to rely on the Twenty-First Amendment can be seen in the fact
that although they are careful not to base their ruling on the Twenty-First
Amendment, they do very clearly base their decision on the presence of
alcohol. 4 ' Although the court explicitly denies using the Twenty-First
Amendment in its decision one gets the strong suspicion that the court
believes it should be.
140 140 F.3d 993, 996 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
141 For example, the court points out that it is not banning all nude dancing, only
"nude dancing where liquor is sold." Id. at 998.
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The difficulties faced by the Sammy's of Mobile court stem from the
44 Liquormart Court's disavowal of the Twenty-First Amendment's
applicability to nude dancing regulation. Such difficulties could have
been alleviated if the Court had looked towards the historic regulation of
alcohol and sex, and held instead that this history, which is recognized in
the Twenty-First Amendment, justifies increased state power to regulate
alcohol and sex. Such a decision would have put an end to the idea that
the Twenty-First Amendment trumps the First Amendment, but would
not have ended the use of the Twenty-First Amendment to justify nude
dancing regulations.
III. STATE REGULATION OF ALCOHOL AND DIRECT
SHIPMENT LAWS
A. THE CONTROVERSY OVER DIRECT SHIPMENT BANS
Decades after the repeal of Prohibition and the adoption of the
Twenty-First Amendment it is not wildly surprising that many people
question the use of the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate billiards
halls and nude dancing establishments. Nonetheless, what is surprising is
the fact that the most vigorous Twenty-First Amendment debate
concerns states' rights to regulate alcohol in general. It would appear
that if Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment has any meaning, it is
that states have the right to regulate the production, importation and sale
of alcohol within their boarders. However, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Granholm v. Heald,142 demonstrates that even this once
unquestioned right is now under attack.
B. THE GRANHOLM DECISION
The Granholm decision rewrites the history of Prohibition in this
country in order to make alcohol regulation fit with modern day mores
rather than recognizing and effectuating the original purpose behind the
Twenty-First Amendment. Although laws should reflect the values of
those they regulate, it is the job of Congress and not the courts to make
changes to out of date laws, especially when the law at issue is a
constitutional amendment.
Granholm concerned the right of states to make different regulations
with regard to in-state and out-of-state wineries. The regulations at issue
permitted in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers, but prohibited
out-of-state wineries from doing the same. There were two different state
142 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005).
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regulations at issue in the Granholm case. The first was the Michigan
regulation scheme, which required that wines shipped by out-of-state
wineries, but not in-state wineries, pass through an in-state wholesaler
and retailer before reaching consumers. The second was the New York
scheme which differed slightly in that it did not ban direct shipments
altogether but rather required out-of- state wineries to establish a
distribution operation in New York before they were permitted to ship
directly to consumers. While it is true that both these regulatory
schemes imposed additional costs on out-of-state wineries that were not
imposed on in-state producers, the Granholm Court was wrong in
finding that this disparate treatment is not permitted under the Twenty-
First Amendment.
According to the Granholm Court, both sets of regulations violated
the Commerce Clause because they mandated "differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter., 143  The Court then considered whether such
differential treatment was nevertheless permissible under the Twenty-
First Amendment and found that the Twenty-First Amendment did not
provide an exception. To reach this conclusion the Court relied on the
history of the Twenty-First Amendment and direct shipment. However,
the Court's decision misinterprets and misunderstands this history.
In 1890, the Wilson Act144 was passed to allow states to regulate the
importation of alcohol into their state. The Wilson Act permitted states
to regulate imported alcohol to the same extent that they regulated
domestic liquor.145 Nevertheless, although the Wilson Act permitted
states to regulate alcohol importation, it did not permit states to ban the
importation of liquor. This loophole was closed by the Webb-Kenyon
Act, which divested liquor of its interstate characteristics and thus
permitted states to ban direct shipments altogether. 46  Ironically,
although the Granholm Court found that the Commerce Clause makes
direct shipment laws unconstitutional, in the pre-Prohibition period,
temperance advocates used the Commerce Clause to convince Congress
141 Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1895.
'44 Wilson Act, 27 USC §121 (1890).
145 d.
146 An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain
cases, (Webb-Kenyon Act), 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1913).
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and the Court that direct shipment regulation was constitutional. 147 It
was "the growing comfort among progressives with use of the
Commerce Clause [that] led Congress to pass the Webb-Kenyon Act in
1913. The Act completely removed 'liquor from the category of
interstate goods, thereby eliminating the commerce clause as an
impediment to state alcohol laws."" 48
Relying on this history, New York and Michigan argued that the
Webb-Kenyon Act removed any barrier to discriminatory state liquor
regulation. The Granholm Court, however, disagreed and determined
that the Webb-Kenyon Act only permitted such bans when they were on
the same terms as those applying to in-state producers. 149 The wording
of section two of the Twenty-First amendment closely follows that of the
Webb-Kenyon Act. Thus, the Court concluded that if the Webb-Kenyon
Act prohibited such differential treatment then the Twenty-First
Amendment must also prohibit differential treatment. 150 However, even
assuming the Court correctly interpreted the scope of the Webb-Kenyon
Act, the history of alcohol regulation in that intervening period between
the passage of that Act and the repeal of Prohibition calls the Court's
conclusion regarding the scope of the Twenty-First amendment into
question.
The Webb-Kenyon Act was passed before the instigation of national
Prohibition. At this point, the proponents of national Prohibition had not
yet won over popular sentiment nor had their message infiltrated the
country's political and legal institutions. As the Granholm opinion
recognizes,15 1 in the period leading up to Prohibition, when the
141 W. J. Rorabaugh, Reexamining the Prohibition Amendment, 8 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 285, 291 (1996) ("At the same time progressives pursued an expansion
of federal power using the Constitution's Commerce Clause.") (book review).
148 Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment
Laws and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U ILL. L. REv. 761, 767 (2002).
149 Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1901-02 ("The Wilson Act reaffirmed and the Webb-
Kenyon Act did not displace, the Court's line of Commerce Clause cases
striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of
state.").
"' Id. at 1902 ("The wording of §2 of the Twenty-First Amendment closely
follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers clear
intention of constitutionalizing this Commerce clause framework established
under those statutes.").
151 Id. at 1898. ("In a series of cases before ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment the Court, relying on the Commerce Clause, invalidated a number
of state liquor regulations.").
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popularity of the Prohibition movement was growing rapidly, the
Supreme Court's decisions were noticeably and decidedly inhospitable
to the movement. 152 During this period, the Court repeatedly struck
down state attempts to ban direct shipments and only barely upheld the
constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act. 153 Consequently, the purpose
and meaning of the Webb-Kenyon Act, which almost failed to pass,
154
cannot be compared with the purpose and scope of the Twenty-First
Amendment which was passed after the success of the Prohibition
movement and years of National Prohibition.
The Webb-Kenyon Act was passed at a time when Prohibitionists
were still fighting to simply close off loopholes to state wide
Prohibition-such as direct shipment. The Web-Kenyon Act was
certainly important to the Prohibition movement but it was only one of
many steps that ultimately led to National Prohibition. Conversely, the
Twenty-First Amendment was ratified after the passage of National
Prohibition and it had the entire weight and achievements of that
movement behind it. In addition, it is important to note that despite our
modem day conceptions about the temperance movement and the
"failure" of Prohibition,155 repeal was in fact not seen as a failure of the
temperance movement. 156  Rather, it was simply a recognition that
national Prohibition did not work and that alcohol regulation decisions
should be left to the states. In fact, if repeal meant anything, it was that
152 In 1898, the Supreme Court held in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898),
that a dry state could not interfere with alcohol that was 'in transit.' This meant
that a state could not seize liquor as a common carrier crossed the state line and
that therefore a state could not prevent alcohol from entering its borders. The
same year, the Court declared in Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co,. 170 U.S. 438,
(1898), that a state could not stop the interstate shipment of liquor for personal
use. In 1905, in American Express v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133 (1905), the Court
further protected interstate shippers by extending federal protection to the point
where the liquor actually reached the consignee. "These rulings resulted in an
open liquor trade in dry areas. Express companies received liquor on behalf of
fictitious consignees and then sold it to anyone who put in a claim." Rorabaugh,
supra note 148, at 291.
153 See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, (1917)
(upholding by a divided court the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act ).
154 Id. See also, Granholm 125 S.Ct. at 1900 (stating that the Act was only
passed after Congress overrode a presidential veto based on the Attomey
General's recommendation that the Act was unconstitutional).
155 Infanti, supra note 2.
156 CLARK, supra notes 6, at 169.
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
temperance goals were best served by local and state regulations as
opposed to federal regulations.
Prohibition had been an effort to centralize and federalize the
regulation of liquor but until Prohibition, temperance objectives had
always been served through local regulations.157 It was the Progressive
movement which pushed for National Prohibition. Progressives
"encouraged the growth and centralization of government power and had
that power applied to issues of labor, health, and liquor." '158 In the
alcohol context, centralized regulation did not work and repeal was
simply recognition of this fact; it was not a rejection of temperance
goals. When the Twenty-First Amendment was passed there was still
widespread temperance sentiment and many states wanted to remain dry
or at least retain the possibility of becoming dry again in the future.159
Section two of the Twenty-First Amendment was passed to ensure that
states would continue to have this option. It was passed to ensure that
states had the legal tools necessary to continue to fully effectuate their
temperance goals.
With this history in mind, section two of the Twenty-First
Amendment, which gives states the power to regulate alcohol, must be
157 See e.g., Dram Shop Act, ch. 64, 1885 Kan. Terr. Stat. 322-24 (codified as
amended at 1868 Kan. Gen. Stat., ch. 35, 1-15). The Dram Shop Act of 1855
authorized localities to accept or reject the legalization of retail outlets and
saloons. 1, 1855 Kan. Terr. Stat. at 322. In communities that opted to permit
liquor sales, applicants for licenses were required to submit petitions to the local
government which had been signed with approval by a majority of the
registered male voters in the jurisdiction. The Legislature also forbade liquor
sales on the Sabbath and to Indians and slaves. See also Indians Act, ch. 84,
1855 Kan. Terr. Stat. 417-19 (codified as amended at 1868 Kan. Gen. Stat. ch.
50, 1-5). Swain, supra note 29, at 345n.13.
158 Susan L. Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause and Consumer Rights, 38 AM BUS L.J. 1,11
(2000).
159 For example, in Florida, national Prohibition repeal was "stirred more by
appeals to state sovereignty and economic hardship than to objections to
enforcement practices, [and] did not end the dry era in Florida." David E. Kyvig,
John J. Guthrie Jr., Keepers of the Spirits: The Judicial Response to Prohibition
Enforcement in Florida, 1885-1935, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 456, 457 (1998)
(book review). In fact, after the repeal of National Prohibition "the state supreme
court ruled that previously existing local option had been reinstated, ironically
providing a more effective prohibition of alcohol for communities that wished it."
Id.
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read much more expansively than the similar provisions of the Webb-
Kenyon Act. Based on this significant historical difference, the purpose
and scope of the Webb-Kenyon Act cannot be considered to accurately
reflect the purpose and scope of the Twenty-First Amendment.
Nevertheless, despite the questionable usefulness of pre-Prohibition
history and case law to an understanding of the Twenty-First
Amendment, the Granholm Court nonetheless chose to base its
interpretation of section two primarily on this information. In fact, the
Court specifically chose not to consider the cases concerning the
Twenty-First Amendment which were decided immediately after its
passage. The Granholm Court chose to disregard these cases despite the
obvious fact that such cases would be the most likely to accurately
reflect contemporary understandings of the Amendment's scope and
purpose.
For example, in State Board. of Equalization of California. v.
Young's Market Co., 160 the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that it
should "construe the [Twenty-First A]mendment as saying, in effect:
The state may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it
prohibits the manufacture and sale within its boarders [sic]; but if it
permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors compete
with the domestic on equal terms., 161 According to the Young's Market
Court, such a holding would "involve not a construction of the
Amendment but a rewriting of it." 162 'The Granholm Court makes an
unconvincing attempt to distinguish Young's Market by stating that "[i]t
is unclear whether the broad language in Young's Market was
unnecessary"'' 63 and by stating that "[s]ome of the cases decided soon
after the ratification of the Twenty-First amendment did not take account
of [Prohibition] history. '
64
The Court's explanation for ignoring such cases is unconvincing. It
is hard to imagine that a court that had just lived through the history of
Prohibition and repeal would not take it into account when interpreting
the Twenty-First Amendment. The entire country knew this history
intimately; therefore, the Court would have had no need to recite it in its
decision. It is axiomatic that cases decided immediately after the
enactment of an amendment are the mostly likely to accurately reflect
160 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Granhom v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1903 (2005).
"4Id. at 1902.
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
the correct understanding of that amendment's purpose. Nevertheless,
although the Granholm Court recognized that the cases immediately
after the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment "reaffirmed the
States' broad powers under § 2" 165 the Court downplays and attempts to
distinguishes these cases, relying instead on later cases that better
support the Court's view that such discrimination is unconstitutional.
166
While it is true that both the Michigan and New York regulation
schemes required different regulations for in-state and out-of-state
wineries this distinction is permissible under the Twenty-First
Amendment. Section two was enacted to ensure that states would have
the ability to effectuate their citizens' temperance goals; even to the
extent that such regulations would otherwise violate the Commerce
Clause. States do not need to require of their in-state wineries the
additional regulations they impose on out-of-state wineries because in-
state wineries are already regulated by that state. As a result, in-state
wineries are significantly more likely to respect and abide by that state's
alcohol regulations than out-of-state wineries. 167  Specifically, the
greatest threat posed by permitting direct shipments by out-of-state
wineries is the possibility that such wineries will not respect the wishes
of this country's numerous dry counties to remain dry. If pre-
Prohibition history is any indication, this is a well founded fear and it is
very likely that the temperance wishes of dry counties will not be
respected by out-of-state wineries. 16
8
C. HISTORICAL CONCERNS WITH DIRECT SHIPMENT
In the pre-Prohibition period, one of the greatest bars to statewide
temperance had been the importation of alcohol from other states. Many
states had problems enforcing temperance and such "enforcement
generally failed, at least in part because of liquor shipped across state
lines.' 69  The lack of effective direct shipment laws was one of the
major issues spurring the drive for National Prohibition.17 °
16 Id. at 1903.
166 Id. at 1890 (citing cases such as 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996); Bacchus Imps, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 273 (1984); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc., v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)).
167 See infra Part III.C-D.
168 See infra Part III.C-D.
169 Rorabaugh, supra note 148, at 288-89.
170 Id. at 291.
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"Prohibitionists concluded that dry areas would only be safe when the
whole country was dry."' 71
When the Twenty-First Amendment was passed, it repealed
Prohibition but it was still intended to encourage and facilitate
temperance. The Amendment achieved this objective by assuring that
states would have the ability to regulate the importation of alcohol
within their boarders, which the pre-Prohibition period had shown was a
crucial part of any state temperance plan.1 2  "Both proponents and
opponents of repeal agreed that the power to regulate alcohol rightly
belonged to the states"'' 73 and they "made sure to eliminate a provision
from an early version of Twenty-First Amendment that empowered both
the federal and state governments to regulate "saloons.', 174 "Both wet
and dry senators objected noting this provision, would undermine the
key purpose of the amendment to return control over liquor regulation to
the states.' '175 When the Twenty-First Amendment was passed, "Senator
Blaine, the Senate sponsor of the Amendment resolution said that its
purpose was 'to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of
intoxicating liquor into those States."",176  He further stated that the
Twenty-First Amendment would "'restore to the states . . . absolute
control ... over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors."",
177
Senator Blaine believed section two of the Amendment would provide a
constitutional safeguard for states that wished to continue their
temperance goals. 78 However, the Granholm Court's decision threatens
to undermine this safeguard.
171 Id. at 289.
172 Brannon P. Denning, Time to Sober Up: The Constitution Does Let States
Stop Cross-Border Alcohol Sales, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004 at 58 ("When
enthusiasm for Prohibition waned, state concerns about their ability to control
the alcohol trade re-emerged.").
173 Id.
'74 Id. ("With that important change, the 'drys' were assured that the dormant
commerce clause doctrine would not be revived to strike down state regulatory
efforts; the 'wets,' too, were provided with constitutional assurances that dry
forces could not use federal power to re-establish some form of Prohibition in
the future."). Id.
175 id.
176 Martin, supra note 159, at 14 (quoting 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (remarks
of Sen. Blaine)).
177 76 CONG. REc. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Blaine), quoted in Martin,
supra note 157 at 14.
171 Id. at 4141 (1933).
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D. DRY COUNTIES AND THE CONTINUED TEMPERANCE THREAT
A state has a variety of means to ensure that its in-state wineries
comply with its alcohol regulations; the incentive for out-of-state
wineries to comply is significantly less. While in-state wineries could
lose their license and hence their entire business for violating the state's
alcohol regulations the threats a state can make to an out-of-state winery
for non-compliance are comparatively minimal. A small out-of-state
winery that violates another state's alcohol regulations is both unlikely to
be caught as well as unlikely to face prosecution. Therefore, it is the
small out-of-state winery which presents the biggest threat to state
temperance goals.
Large wineries are not the issue in the direct shipment debate. An
out-of-state winery that does substantial business in a particular state has
incentives to comply with state regulations. Such wineries did not have
significant difficulties complying with the types of regulations struck
down by the Granholm court because they were large enough, and well
known enough such that the state's direct shipment regulations did not
significantly affect their ability to do business within the state. 179 The
wineries that were most affected by direct shipment regulations were the
small wineries that did not make many sales within a particular state and
were thus financially prohibited from selling in that state due to the
state's direct shipment regulations. 18° Thus, it is these small wineries
which present the greatest temperance threat. Even with many direct
shipment laws now declared unconstitutional it is still unlikely that
direct shipments from small wineries will increase to such an extent that
these wineries will now have sufficient incentive to make sure they abide
by a state's other alcohol regulations.
The threat of non-compliance with such state regulations is
significant because more than seventy years after the repeal of
Prohibition, many areas of the country still prefer to remain dry.1 81 At
179 Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1892 (2005) (describing the direct
shipment issue as one of "small wineries." The Court stated that "[t]he
increasing winery-to-wholesaler ratio means that many small wineries do not
produce enough wine or have sufficient consumer demand for their wine to
make it economic for wholesalers to carry their products .... This has lead
many small wineries to rely on direct shipping to reach new markets.").180 Id.
181 This is very important given the frequent argument that direct shipment laws
can serve no temperance purpose if they do not also ban intra-state shipments of
alcohol. According to this argument, unless a state also bans intra-state
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the time of repeal, many states decided to remain dry and there was the
very real possibility that additional states might join them in the future.
In the period before National Prohibition states frequently fluctuated
back and forth between being wet or dry,182 and although it has been
decades since the last state-wide Prohibition legislation was repealed,
this does not mean that the temperance purpose of direct shipment bans
are no longer relevant. However, what the lack of fully dry states does
mean is that although there is still a significant desire for alcohol
regulations, the ability of these regulations to effectuate temperance
goals is in many ways more difficult. While it is unlikely that entire
states will become dry again, hundreds of counties throughout the
country continue to remain dry and for these areas, direct shipment bans
continue to serve a temperance purpose.
1 83
In fact, it is because there are no longer any dry states that direct
shipment regulations are perhaps more necessary now than any time
shipments, direct shipment bans cannot possibly serve temperance goals.
However, temperance purposes are served by direct shipment bans even if states
allowed the in-state shipment of alcohol. It is not about the availability of
alcohol within that state, but the way in which that alcohol and its availability
are regulated. Martin, supra note 159, at 21 & n. 146 (arguing that there can be
no temperance purpose when "residents can become as drunk on local wines...
as those ... kept out of state by... statute." (citing Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 691, 710 (S.D. Tex. 2000)); Vijay Shanker, Alcohol Direct Shipment
Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV.
353, 377 (1999) (arguing that direct shipment laws are unconstitutional because
"federal courts have increasingly required state laws regulating alcohol to be
passed with the intent of furthering the core Amendment purpose:
temperance"); John Foust, Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the
Twenty-First Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First
Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 659, 691-92 (arguing that "direct
shipment laws ... are not realistically designed to promote temperance.").
182 See supra note 7.
183 For example, out of the 75 counties that comprise Arkansas, 43 are dry.
Kenneth Heard, Private Clubs Puncture State's Wet, Dry Divide, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, March 14, 2004, available at LEXIS. Similarly, "26 of
Alabama's 67 counties have a total ban on alcohol sales," William Brand,
Untouchable Pale Ale Memorable, OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 14, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 17072242, there are 51 dry counties in Texas, Cameron Siewert,
J.J. Sedelmaier Production, Inc. Presents... : How Dry I Am! Or: What's a
Girl Gotta Do to Get a Drink in this Place, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WLNR 8850073, and "almost half of Oklahoma's 77 counties
remain dry," Half of Oklahoma Counties Still 'Dry,' MODERN BREWERY AGE,
Jan. 5, 2004, available at LEXIS.
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since repeal. Modem state alcohol regulations must be considered with
regard to effectuating local, rather than state- wide temperance goals.
The regulations struck down by the Granholm Court were examples of
regulations geared towards enabling temperance goals in the modem
landscape of dry counties as opposed to the older model of dry states.
Such regulations were better able to ensure that alcohol was still
available to those communities that want it and unavailable in those
communities where it was unwanted.
In the hundreds of dry counties throughout the country, residents are
strongly opposed to the sale of alcohol and continue to fight hard to keep
their communities dry. Many of these communities feel real frustration
at attempts to get around their county's dry laws. 184  Dry counties
wishing to remain dry are often aided by strong state regulations, which
closely regulate the sale of alcohol. Allowing direct shipments into these
states would also undermine such regulation and also weaken the
protection dry counties currently have from alcohol sold in nearby wet
counties. In addition to the hundreds of dry counties, many more
communities are somewhere in between, boasting varying degrees of
wetness. 185  Allowing direct shipments would undermine these
communities' efforts to remain dry.
For example, in Texas, state regulations prevent state producers of
wine from mailing their products directly to consumers. Instead, these
producers must ship the wine to the buyer's closest package store. Such
stores are not located in dry counties and therefore in-state shipments of
184 "'It's a constant battle,' Stacy said. 'They are always looking for a way to
get around the will of the people. Seventy percent voted this county dry. It is a
constant battle. We are opposed to alcohol in any shape, form or fashion -
especially in a dry county.' Kenneth Heard, Jonesboro Liquor Battle Shaping
Up Restaurateur Seeking Alcohol Permit Faces Opposition in Dry County,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2004, available at LEXIS.
185 For instance, in North Carolina:
Sometimes local rules say only bars and restaurants can serve alcohol,
and others allow grocers and convenience stores to sell it, too .... [and
1]ocal rules may allow some or all of the following: mixed drinks, beer
to be drunk at a bar, beer to be taken home, wine and 'fortified wine'
such as port or sherry. The only package liquor comes from ABC
stores, authorized by state law but run by local governments.
Ellen Sung, Micro, N.C., Can't Manage to Fend Off Beer Sales, NEWS AND
OBSERVER, March 4, 2004, at Al.
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alcohol do not undermine these communities' temperance choices.
Although out-of-state wine producers could be subject to the same
requirement there is, as described above, a much greater likelihood of
non-compliance. Local wine producers, who are regulated by the state
and sell primarily within the state, have a very strong incentive not to
violate the state's liquor laws.18 6 However, out-of-state producers do not
have the same incentives to comply. If out-of-state producers are
allowed to ship directly to consumers, the number of producers that the
state would have to monitor to ensure compliance with local option laws
would multiply by the thousands. States do not have the time or
resources to devote to this kind of enforcement 187 and as a result, there
would be an extremely high incentive for out-of-state producers to
ignore the desires of dry counties and ship to them regardless of local
option laws. Both the likelihood, as well as the penalties, of getting
caught would be much lower for out-of-state producers.
History has shown that direct shipments severely undermine state
temperance efforts and they are similarly likely to erode counties'
temperance efforts for the same reason. The Twenty-First Amendment
was enacted to help prevent local temperance efforts from being
undermined after the repeal of Prohibition and many parts of the country
still need this protection from direct shipments. The fact that the
Supreme Court no longer recognizes this need may say more about a
change in those who advocate temperance than a change in the need for
temperance protections.
E. THE NEW TEMPERANCE ADVOCATES
In his work on the symbolic meaning of Prohibition, Joseph Gusfeld
describes the temperance movement as the "efforts of urban, native
Americans to consolidate their middle-class status through a sharpened
distinction between the native, middle class life style and those of the
186 Interview with Richard Haak, Owner, Haak Vineyards, in San Antonio, Tex.,
(May 4, 2004), stating that even after the Fifth Circuit's decision striking down
direct shipment regulations he will not ship out of state until he gets permission
from either the Supreme Court or the state legislature.
187 The lack of resources spent on enforcement can be seen in the fact that the
last case to prosecute someone for selling alcohol in a dry area in the state of
Texas was in 1973, but even in that case the judgment was eventually reversed.
Rose v. State, 499 S.W.2d 12 (Tx. Crim. App. 1973)(reversing conviction
because sentence was void for indefiniteness)
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immigrant and the marginal laborer or farmer."1 88 According to Gusfeld
the temperance movement was a battle over whose morals would define
the country. In the pre-Prohibition period, the temperance reformers
defined "abstinence as a symbol of respectability,"' 189 these "advocates
assumed that the drinkers should be converted to the modes of middle-
class, respectable citizens."' 90 In addition, not only did the temperance
advocates believe temperance was an admirable personal choice, but
they asserted that such beliefs were "dominant in society and worthwhile
for others to copy." 191
However, after the repeal of Prohibition the composition of
abstainers changed. "[A]bstinence today is most frequent in the lower-
middle and lower class."'192  The abstainer has lost his "place of
legitimacy in the middle class and dominance in society."' 93  The
moderate drinker has become the "new standard and those from whom
he defects [abstainers] are now the aberrant followers of a past
doctrine."' 94 Since Prohibition there as been a dramatic role reversal in
terms of the meaning of drinking in this country and this change is
exemplified by the direct shipment debate. The direct shipment
controversy reveals the continuing desire of middle and upper middle
class Americans to assert their views regarding drinking on the lower
classes.
This desire is apparent in the many newspaper articles concerning
direct shipment, which heap condescension and ridicule on those who
might support direct shipment bans. For example, the intro to one article
on direct shipment begins "Every year thousands of eonophiles ...
The article then pauses to condescendingly describe the term for those
readers who may not understand such "sophisticated language;"
presumably those who are not eonophiles themselves.' 96 Another direct
shipment article begins by asking its readers, "Dying to get a bottle of
Chardonnay or cabernet from that little winery you visited on your last
188 GUSFELD, supra note 43, at 36-37.
181 Id. at 50, 59.
'90 d. at 82.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 138.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 136.
195 Blake Devorak, Let the Wine Flow Like Water, CONSUMERS' RESEARCH
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2003.
196 id.
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vacation?"' 97 One can only imagine what the author would think of
people who have never taken a vacation to a winery, let alone do not
believe in drinking wine. A third article on alcohol regulation describes
the recent lifting of a seventy-two year liquor ban in Rockport,
Massachusetts.198 In the article, a local inn keeper granted one of the
first liquor licenses flippantly dismisses "naysayers," saying that the
legalization of alcohol will "make Rockport better."' 99
In addition to the implied condescension towards non-drinkers, the
authors of these articles express unabashed moral indignation at being
subjected to direct shipment laws. For example, one author first referred
to wine as "a necessary of life" and then expressed his outrage that it is
"easier to buy Viagra, ammunition, and bootleg music online than it is to
buy a bottle of out-of-state merlot., 200  Another article ridiculed an
Alcohol Beverage Control spokesman for his presumption in thinking
that state liquor stores could adequately satisfy consumer demand for
wine variety. °0  These articles also frequently use the terms
"ridiculous, ' '202 "absurd" 20 3 and "archaic ' '2 4 when discussing direct
shipment laws.
Such articles demonstrate that once again middle class values
regarding alcohol are being touted as the only acceptable ones, except
now it is the non-drinker who is the object of scorn and considered in
need of reform. Nonetheless, the fact that section two of the Twenty-
First Amendment is no longer aligned with middle class beliefs
regarding alcohol is not a reason for disregarding it. Section two still
provides protection for those who value temperance, which is why it was
197 Clint Bolick, Uncork the Bottleneck for Arizona's Wine Lovers, THE
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 2003 at 9B.
198 Seaside Town Lifts Liquor Ban, The BostonChannel.com, at
http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/4711914/detail.htm (July 12, 2005).
199 Id.
200 Tony Mauro, Interstate Wine Sales Start to Flow, USA TODAY, Dec. 16
2002 at 15A.
201 Elisabeth Frater, Virginia Vintner Takes on New York Courts; Virginia
Direct Shipping Law Ruled Unconstitutional, 84 WINES AND VINES 128, Jan. 1,
2003.
202 Fred LeBrun, Don't Let Sour Grapes Spoil Harvest, THE TIMES UNION,
March 9, 2004, at B 1.
203 Kristin Eddy, Grape vs. Government; Varying State Laws Confuse the Task
of Buying Wine Online, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2002, at 7.
204 Daniel Howes, Archaic Law That Bans Wine Shipments Sounds Like Sour
Grapes, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov 21, 2003, at lB.
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originally enacted. Therefore, when considering the constitutionality of
direct shipment bans from both a historical as well as a modem day
temperance stand point, the decision is wrong. There is still a desire for
temperance in this country and the right of states to protect the
temperance values of their communities is one that is guaranteed by the
Twenty-First Amendment.
The Granholm decision ignores the fact that many communities still
desire alcohol regulation and that the schemes struck down by the Court
were both constitutional and helped protect communities' temperance
wishes. Enforcing alcohol regulations has always been difficult, but it is
much easier for a state to regulate its own alcohol producers than out-of-
state producers. Consequently, in-state wineries do not present the threat
to state temperance goals posed by out-of-state wineries and thus, the
direct shipment regulations imposed by Michigan and New York were
completely in keeping with the purpose and scope of the Twenty-First
Amendment. These regulations ensured that states could effect the
temperance goals of their citizens by regulating alcohol consumption
within their borders.
CONCLUSION
Although there is a widespread belief that the repeal of Prohibition
ended the influence of the temperance movement, such views are
misinformed. The reasons for repeal were myriad, but for the most part
they were not based on the belief that temperance objectives were
objectionable. Although many people still believed in and desired
temperance, National Prohibition had demonstrated that it could not be
achieved by the federal government without creating more problems
than it solved. "Widespread bootlegging and racketeering, together with
a popular perception that these crimes were inadequately and
inconsistently enforced, were important issues in the debate over
repeal, 20 5 Prohibition had shown that federal enforcement could not
work but the repeal of Prohibition did not represent a rejection of
temperance. In the period following the repeal of Prohibition, alcohol
consumption in the country was at the lowest levels it had ever been
206
and many states remained completely dry long after repeal. Oklahoma
205 Kevin W. Swain, Note, Liquor by the Book In Kansas: The Ghost of
Temperance Past, 35 Washburn L.J. 322, 331 (1996).
206 CLARK, supra note 6, at 146.
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did not repeal its statewide Prohibition until 1959207 and Mississippi
remained dry until 1966.208
In the end, the strongest reason for repeal was economic.' °9 By the
time of repeal, America was deeply entrenched in the throes of the
Depression and there was a desperate need for more jobs and more taxes.
Many people believed that resuming the manufacture of beer would help
put idle men back to work. In addition, other people argued that a liquor
tax could help end the Depression, suggesting that such a tax "would be
sufficient to pay off the debt of the United States ... in a little less than
fifteen years., 2'0 As a result, in 1933 National Prohibition was repealed,
but the effects of the temperance movement continue to be felt.
20 7Thomas E. Rutledge, Comment: Comment: The Questionable Viability of the
Des Moines Warranty in Light of Brown-Forman Corp. v. New York, 78 Ky. L.J.
209, 235 n.6 (1990).
208 John Dinan, The State Constitutional Tradition and the Formation of
Virtuous Citizens, 72 TEMPLE L. REv. 619, 670 n.320 (1999).
209 CLARK, supra note 6, at 200. See also Brendon T. Ishikawa, The Stealth
Amendment: The Impending Ratification and Repeal of a Federal Budget
Amendment, 35 TULSA L.J. 353, 378-79 (2000), explaining that:
With the worsening of the economic plight of millions, support
for Prohibition 'sank with breathtaking speed.' Over and over
again, opponents argued that Prohibition effectively worsened the
Depression because the vast profits of the illicit liquor and
bootlegging industry escaped taxation. Some asserted that the
national debt could would [sic] have been paid off prior to the
Depression if Prohibition had not eliminated a major source of
national revenues. References to the national debt harkened back
to President Hoover's dogged determination to raise taxes and
curb governmental spending even as the economy's vigor eroded.
The Prohibition Amendment's repeal raised the possibility that
the new source of governmental funds could ease the widespread
economic hardships. 'The return of beer raised the often-
expressed hope that repeal would help solve the depression.'
When Americans voted for delegates to the ratifying conventions,
they voted overwhelmingly for the return of alcohol as well as
the return of a large source of federal funds.
210 CLARK, supra note 6, at 200.
